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REVIEW ESSAY
GENDER FAULTLINES OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM AND THE ADVANCE OF
THE CONTEMPORARY RIGHT: THE
CASE OF INDIA©
SUBVERSIVE SITES: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH
LAW IN INDIA
RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN
(New Delhi: Sage, 1996) 352 pages
By RADHIKA DEsAI*
Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman's joint work hitherto
comments generally on the legal and constitutional implications of the
rise of the Hindu Right in India and specifically as they relate to
women.1 The work is already distinguished by a keen historical
understanding of Indian law and discernment about what is at stake: the
fate of India's enduring, but hardly flawless, liberal democratic
constitutional polity. Subversive Sites2 represents an extension and
deepening of this progressive and feminist engagement. The book's fine
and thorough research, as evinced in extensive and careful notes, places
the Indian women's movement's engagement with the law and the
perplexities with which it confronts Indian feminism in the historical
perspective of the working of colonial and independent Indian law. Only
such an account is capable of demonstrating the historical relationship
© 1998, R. Desai.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria.
1 See in particular R. Kapur & B. Cossman, "Communalising Gender/Engendering
Community: Women, Legal Discourse and Saffron Agenda" Econ. & Pol. Wkly. (24 April 1993)
WS-35, and R. Kapur & B. Cossman "Secularism: Benchmarked by Hindu Right" Econ. & Pol.
Wkly. (21 September 1996) 2613.
2 R. Kapur & B.A. Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law in India (New
Delhi: Sage, 1996).
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between the formatively-flawed liberalism of the Indian state and
constitution on gender issues (and related ones of cultural difference),
and the contemporary challenge the Hindu Right represents by
advancing along precisely these fractures of Indian liberalism.
The authors bring a fertile combination of scholarly
understanding and practical engagement to their task. Ratna Kapur is a
lawyer and co-director of the Centre for Feminist Legal Research in
New Delhi who has also been a visiting professor at the National Law
School, and is engaged in training legal activists and in legal literacy.
Brenda Cossman, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, directs
the Institute of Feminist Legal Studies. The progressive, liberal, and
feminist commitments of Subversive Sites enable an awareness of the
historicity and contextuality of law and prevent it from minimizing the
complexity and scale of either the problems or the solutions both of
which the law, as they clearly see, has represented for Indian feminists.
Even in its recourse to post-structuralism to comprehend the
contingency and partiality of our knowledge and to help theorize the
complex constitution of women's agency through intersecting and
multiple discourses, 3 Subversive Sites steers clear of post-structuralism's
incubus of political ambiguity and, for the most part, of textual turbidity.
Subversive Sites combines, then, a highly qualified authorship
with a rare intellectual ambition. As such, I would argue, it should
arouse interest well beyond Indianist and legalist audiences. Previously,
the effort to integrate the modern Indian experience into broader
understandings of the dynamics of modern capitalist societies has been
effectively thwarted by a pervasive Indian exceptionalism rooted,
unforgivably, in an exoticization, not to speak of orientalization, of its
specificities. The dominant trend of scholarship about India is one in
which "[t]he persistence of the democratic form of government ... and
the adaptations of that form [since independence] are often treated in
isolation from each other." As a result, "[i]nnovative adaptations of
democracy ... are treated as signs of degeneration and decay and are
blamed on the absence of a democratic tradition and political culture."4
Lamentably for scholarship, moreover, this has prevented the Indian
experience "from being a source of reflection and enlightenment about
the pathologies of the western [and generally non-Indian] ... social
31bi at 33-35.
4 J. Lele, "A Welfare State in Crisis? Reflections on the Indira Rajiv Era," in N.K. Choudhry
& S. Mansur, eds., The Indira-Rajiv Years (Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, University of
Toronto, 1994) 39.
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formation[s]."s Kapur and Cossman, in contrast, rightly take the liberal
democratic and constitutional character of the Indian polity seriously. In
doing so, they enable critical scholars to learn about and from Indian
experience. The aspect of it which forms the subject of the book is
ominously relevant well beyond India's borders.
Feminists and progressives everywhere have registered the
threats of extreme right forces, themselves of differing strengths in
different countries. Less noticed is the more uniformly pervasive
emergence, in the wake of the neo-liberal new Right, of similar forms of
conservatism and illiberalism within mainstream discourses. They focus
primarily on culture without, of course, entirely abandoning neo-liberal
economic themes. Indeed, they build upon, supplement, and occlude
them as necessary. While pegged on nationally specific concrete issues
in each case, and therefore at first glance quite different, ideologically
these forms of conservatism and illiberalism are united by an attack on
the structures and practices of a grossly undertheorized and therefore
vulnerable progressive liberalism. It is on the one hand a majoritarian
attack on cultural difference disguised as a defence of liberal values and
practices (e.g., the attack on "political correctness" so familiar in the
English-speaking world) and on the other, a re-subordination of women,
in new socio-economic conditions, in the guise of a valorizing and
naturalizing of gender difference. The close relationship between the
extreme and mainstream forms of this emergent right discourse is
particularly clear in the Indian Hindu Right. In its ideological and
programmatic oscillation between the extremists within its fold and the
lure of power through a "mainstreaming" of its discourse, the Hindu
Right is poised precisely between these two equally dangerous forms of
authoritarian conservatism. These various national right discourses also
share structural similarities arising from similarities of the terrains on
which they have arisen,6 the tasks they face, 7 and the social forces they
5 j. Lele, "Orientalism and the Social Sciences," in C. A. Breckenridge & P. van der Veer,
eds., Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 45 at 56.
6 A certain institutional and discursive embeddedness of liberalism is an example.
7 For example, reinforcing patriarchy in new conditions, especially those in which extensive
participation of women in the labour force must now be a given, and establishing majoritarian
cultural identities.
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represent: a broad swath of professional and business middle classes
increasingly resentful of political assertions from below.8
Insofar as this Right must often operate, as in India, on a terrain
of already established liberal and democratic institutions, its distinctive
engagement with these institutions demands understanding, both
comparatively and with an eye to each national historical specificity.
The history of the Right is, after all, a history defined by neither
organizational nor theoretical continuities, though some recurring
thematics can also be discerned.9 Rather, it is defined precisely by
opportunistic denaturing of existing institutions and discourses with a
view to the exigencies of the times and to the tasks it is called upon to
perform at given historical conjunctures. In going about this, the Right
exploits and lays bare the limitations of liberal and progressive
institutions and forces. These are processes that must be understood
anew in each historical phase of the consolidation of the Right and they
also raise anew important questions about the strategies progressive
forces must use against these threats in each national context.
Necessarily, these must involve not a simple-minded defence of the
existing (already flawed) laws and institutions, nor a reliance on them to
hold the fort against the right (in which they are apt to fail and in failure,
to disillusion progressives into various dangerous forms of illiberalism of
their own), but a more fundamental strategy reintegrating them to the
purposes of further progressive social change, clear-eyed about their
potential and historical flaws and limitations. What is the nature of the
Right as it is reconstituting itself today? In particular, what challenges
does it present for feminism? What is the terrain on which it operates
and what specific weaknesses of the liberal order, in particular its legal
form, and progressive forces does it exploit? And finally, given the
lessons of the past, what strategies, in particular what legal strategies,
can and should be employed against these forces by feminists and
progressives? These are the questions Subversive Sites asks about the
Indian case. And I think I could fairly say to progressives everywhere,
as Marx said to Germans who complacently believed that the
depredations of industrial capitalist development described in Capital
8 S. Zizek, "Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism" (September-
October 1997) 225 New Left Rev. 28; T. Brass, "Moral Economists, Subalterns, New Social
Movements and the (Re-) Emergence of a (Post-) Modernised (Middle) Peasant" (1991) 18 J.
Peasant Stud. 173; and T. Brass, "The Agrarian Myth, the 'New' Populism and the 'New' Right"
Econ. & Pol. Wkly. (25 January 1997) PE-27.
9 See J.Z. Muller, ed., Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought fron David
Hume to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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only concerned England, "De te fabula narratur!"-the story is about
you.
Drawing on the most insightful analyses of the Hindu Right in
India, Kapur and Cossman see it involved in a "struggle for ideological
hegemony [which] includes an effort to rearticulate an identity for
women which is thoroughly imbued with the discourses of family and
tradition and yet thoroughly rooted in the material conditions of the late
twentieth century."]0 Kapur and Cossman do not mistake the
"religious" or "fundamentalist" archaic character of the Hindu Right for
the chief source of its reactionary authoritarianism, but correctly focus
on its cultural majoritarianism, in which, continuing the colonial legacy,
culture is collapsed into religion. Cultural majoritarianism is actually
articulated as a purer "secularism" and has become disturbingly
"mainstream," deploying apparently liberal arguments in a contest over
the meaning of the central liberal ordering principles of the Indian
polity, such as secularism and equality, thereby seeking to move them
decisively to the right. Indeed, the section entitled "Women and the
New Tradition,"11 relying on some of the best Indian feminist legal and
historical research,12 reveals the complex modernity of the Hindu Right
which appropriates the liberal language of equality and women's rights
including that to paid employment in creating a "modern but not
western" 13 identity for Indian women.] 4 Like forces of the Right
elsewhere, the Hindu Right also freely appropriates "feminist" issues
like violence against women and "obscenity" regulations.
The Hindu Right's chief and legal demand for a Uniform Civil
Code (uce) would dissolve the admittedly unsatisfactory regime of
different personal laws for different religious communities. Although
usually regarded as a legacy of a form of colonial rule that rested
centrally on dividing the major religious communities from each other, it
is actually a more complex product of modern India's own community,
10 Supra note 2 at 274-75.
11 Ibid. at 265-73.
12 That of Urvashi Butalia, Amrita Chhachhi, Uma Chakravarty, Lata Mani, Kum Kum
Sangari, Tanika Sarkar, Rajeshwari Sunderrajan, Sudesh Vaid and others.
13 Supra note 2 at 267.
14 Similar aspects of the Right's discourse elsewhere largely remain unremarked. But see B.
Campbell, The Iron Ladies: Why Do Women Vote Tory? (London: Virago, 1987). In the Indian case,
Tanika Sarkar's pioneering work-T. Sarkar, "The Woman as Communal Subject: Rashtriyasevika
Samiti and the Ram Janmabhoomi Movement" Econ. & Pol. Wkly. (31 August 1991) 2057--on
which this book relies, must be mentioned, as must the collection she edited with Urvashi Butalia, T.
Sarkar & U. Butalia, eds., Women and the Hindu Right (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1995).
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gender, and class structures and their colonial underdevelopment. The
Indian ConstitutionlS itself regards this as a temporary measure,
providing in its Directive Principles of State Policyl6 that they eventually
be replaced by a ucc, a provision which aims to direct the further
evolution of Indian society in a more liberal direction. However, instead
of replacing it with a progressive code including urgently-needed
provisions for effective gender parity, the Hindu Right would establish a
ucc which "would be based most closely on existing [elite] Hindu norms
and practices,"17 while denying formal equality to women by retaining
the heavy patriarchal bias of the existing regime of the supposedly
"reformed" but in factl8 highly-discriminatory Hindu personal laws.
Kapur and Cossman also neatly show the Hindu Right's demand for a
ucc can appear fairly mainstream precisely because it actually exploits
already-existing flaws in the legal regime:
The demand for a Uniform Civil Code is articulated within the discourse of formal
equality. ... When the Hindu Right argues that all women must be treated equally, they
mean that Muslim women should be treated the same as Hindu women. ... [Dominant
traditions in Indian law, as much as the Hindu Right's proposals] are based on treating
women differently than men. Women are different than men and need to be protected
from men. The discourse of equality is at one and the same time being used to reinforce
the idea that all women are or should be the same, aswell as the idea that women are not
and should not be the same as men. Two models of equality converge to allow the Hindu
Right to delegitimise the recognition of religious and cultural difference without
challenging the assertion of natural gender difference. 19
Nehru's hailing of this reform as revolutionary in symbol, "the
outstanding achievement" of his time, tended to obscure the extent to
which this reform was symbolic rather than substantial, which is precisely
what the conservatives intended. As one member of the old guard, who
laboured to ensure that the "reform" remained well within the limits of
orthodoxy, commented: "what is important is that henceforward
daughters would have a sense of property irrespective of what actual
property she would get under the law."20 That this reform also affords
the dominant Hindu community the luxury of an air of liberal superiority
15 Constitution of India (1950).
16 Ibid. Part IV.
17 Supra note 2 at 261.
18 This is the case on all fronts-marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption, inheritance.
19 Supra note 2 at 256-57.
20 R. Som, "Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance"
(1994) 28 Mod. Asian Stud. 165 at 191-92 [emphasis in original]. See the article for a discussion on
the limitations of the "reform" of Hindu laws and the Hindu Civil Code and its history.
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over other "unreformed" communities, in particular Muslims, is the
corresponding flaw in the dominant discourse also exploited by the
Hindu Right. It can argue that the extension of this Hindu code to other
religious communities would be an advance towards a more authentic
secularism while burying questions of gender equality.
In this book, structured rather like a Russian doll with three sets
of arguments each nestled inside another, Kapur and Cossman's
arguments about the Hindu Right are only the innermost. They are
contained within, and made fully comprehensible only by their argument
about the hegemonic discourse regarding women in India which governs
the law's relationship with women. This relationship involves not only
"laws that explicitly discriminate against women" but also those "that
have been designed for women's benefit," and not only the content of
the law regulating women in India but also its working even in "attempts
to address women's subordination through the law."21 These pre-
existing limitations leave the door open to the depredations proposed by
the Hindu Right; the "ideological appeal of the Hindu Right lies in the
extent to which it deploys this already hegemonic ideology, which ...
deeply imbue[s] the legal regulation of women." 22
Kapur and Cossman argue that there is a "dominant familial
ideology" which "shapes the legal regulation of women" morally, where
"women are constituted as, and judged in accordance with the standards
of, loyal ... self-sacrificing wives," and economically, where "women are
constituted as economically dependent" in a way which extends to "the
legal regulation of women in the labour market and even to the
(de)regulation of women in the new economic policies." 2 3 This
commendably simple and clear argument serves to make the subject of
women's status in India and its relationship to the law both more
comprehensible in its specificity and comparable to other national
cases.24 It achieves this within the broader historical and theoretical
understanding of the distinction between public and private in modern
capitalist societies as it also underlines the similarity of the Right's
exploitation of the gender limitations of established legal discourse.
Of course, the Indian situation also has its specificity: "In India,
the nuclear family is not the dominant ideological form," but "the joint
21 Supra note 2 at 16.
22 ibid. at 274.
23 Ibid. at 15. See also at 147-51.
24 See, for example, M. Barrett & M. McIntosh, The Anti-Social Family (London: Verso,
1982).
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family" which is supposed to include "parents, sons, their wives and
children and unmarried daughters." 25 Unsurprisingly, the modern legal
entrenchment of this ideology is a colonial artifact, traceable to
Orientalism: "Sir Henry Maine ... believed that he had discovered in
India a living example of the patriarchal family in ancient times ... held
together by subjection to the eldest living ascendant father, grandfather
or great-grandfather." 26 Equally unsurprisingly, like dominant familial
ideologies elsewhere, this one too functions as a repressive ideal
imposed over widely different realities: "A.M. Shah's studies on the
family in India have suggested that this joint family was not in fact the
more prevalent form of household structure in the past, particularly in
rural areas," and it "may have been more prevalent in traditional urban
areas." 27
Other studies have revealed that there are in India "as many as
eleven different family types" and that
the majority of Indians do not live in joint families, but rather in either joint or
supplemental nuclear families, that is nuclear families with at least one additional adult
member such as an elderly parent or an unmarried daughter [and that t]here has been an
enormous increase in female headed households ... [which] now constitute 30-35 percent
of rural households... .8
In Indian law the ideology of the joint family enforces women's
subordinate position by constructing them as weak and in need of
protection, formally equal but getting different treatment because they
are not the "same" as men. Kapur and Cossman work out their
argument through a discussion of the gamut of legal areas relating to
women: marriage, inheritance, employment, pornography, and so on. It
can perhaps be sampled through a brief look at one-inheritance laws.
Governed by assumptions about women's economic dependence
within a patriarchal and patrilineal joint family, the law is marked by a
denial of even formal equal rights. Whereas the Hindu Right, fully
exploiting the symbolic value of the "reform" of Hindu personal laws,
has tended to focus on the limitations of, in particular, Muslim personal
laws, Kapur and Cossman, not only point to the still glaring
discrimination against women in Hindu laws, but also elaborate usefully
the feminist important argument that the law of succession, like many
other laws "discriminates against women as daughters and wives" across
2 5 Supra note 2 at 91.
26 Ibid.
2 71bia at 92.
2 8 Ibid.
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virtually all personal laws.29 This argument shifts the discussion of the
issue out of the mire of the comparative "progressiveness" or otherwise
of this or that personal law and religious community which, in any case,
risks running afoul of the Hindu Right's discourse, and points to the
more pervasive national flaws on which progressives and feminists must
focus.
The Hindu Succession Act, 195630 had been successfully limited
by its opponents from granting equal property rights to women: it would
be "equality run mad" and "lead to a breakdown of the joint Hindu
family." It justified the discrimination in a denatured equality argument
claiming that "women had equal rights under Hindu Law, but that the
Hindu conception of sex equality involved dissimilarity, not identity."31
So while the Act gave women full ownership rights in property they
inherited from their husbands, rather than the mere life interest they
had hitherto had, and daughters were given equal rights as sons in their
father's self-acquired estate, several other discriminations remained.
The assumption that the joint Hindu family consists only of the male line
whose members acquire an interest in ancestral property at birth was left
in place, while also discriminating against women in regard to the
proportionally preponderant ancestral property.
The assumption of patrilocality of the joint Hindu family gives
female heirs no rights in relation to the family dwelling house.
Moreover, the gender-neutral granting of full testamentary power to all
persons over their property "in practice ... can be and often is used to
disinherit females." 32 Laws governing succession to the property of
Hindu women also serve "to guarantee that property continues to be
inherited through the male line from which it came-either back to her
father's family or back to her husband's family."33
With the exception of Parsi personal law, the personal laws of
other religious communities also discriminate against women on the
matter of succession. In the laws of the Hanafi School, for example,
which govern the majority of Indian (Sunni) Muslims, "the general
2 9 ibid. at 133-34. This is not surprising in view of the dominant Indian family ideology which
also governs non-personal and therefore religiously-unspecific laws affecting women such as those
related to paid work.
30 1956, no. 30 (India).
31 Supra note 2 at 56. See J.M. Everett, Women and Social Change in India (New Delhi:
Heritage, 1979) at 176.
32 Ibid. at 136. See B. Agarwal, A Field of One's Own: Gender and Law Rights in South Asia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 215.
33 Supra note 2 at 135-36.
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principle is that the female heir will take half the share of the male" and
there is an assumption that "women do not need as much property as
men."34 What is common to all these laws is that the law
continues to be shaped by the patrilineal and patrilocal nature of the ideologically
dominant family, and its assumptions of women's economic dependency. The assumption
that property should descend primarily through the male line has not been completely
displaced. Nor has the assumption that married daughters become the economic
responsibility of their husband's families. Despite reforms to these laws, the rules of
inheritance continue at some level to both assume and inscribe women's economic
dependency on some male member in the family-unmarried daughter on her father,
wife in her husband and widow on her adult son(s).35
Moreover, across all personal laws, there is no recognition of marital
property such that
[t]he contribution that the woman may have made to the marital relationship in terms of
domestic labour and child care is not recognized as a contribution to property.... Familial
ideology defines these activities as the "natural" concern and obligation of women in
their capacities as wives and mothers and not as the basis for any property entitlement 3 6
Judicial decisions have thwarted challenges to these
discriminatory laws. For example, when the provision that a property
inherited by a wife from her husband was to devolve upon her husband's
heirs was challenged on the grounds that it was discriminating-there
being no reciprocal provision for the property a husband inherits from
his wife-the challenge was rejected: "the court held that the rules were
enacted with a clear intention of ensuring the continuity of the property
within the husband's line."37
As is well known, the law, however discriminatory, acquires a
large part of its legitimacy by actually working on its own terms. The
"progressive" content of Indian law derives from a constitutional
recognition of the special disabilities suffered by disadvantaged groups
such as women (and the low castes and the tribes) and a commitment to
rectify these through minimal compensatory action. However, the fact
that it "does not acknowledge any moral responsibility for the grave social
injustices perpetrated by the traditional oppression of women and the
perpetuation of the caste system" 38 is exactly what leaves it open to the
34 Ibid. at 136-37. Christian law similarly discriminates against wives, but not daughters.
35 1bid. at 137.
3 6 Ibid at 139.
37 1bida at 200.
3 8 A. Mahanta, "The Indian State and Patriarchy" in T.V. Sathyamurthy, ed., State and Nation
in the Context of Social Change, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 90.
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contemporary right-wing attack, like affirmative action everywhere
nowadays. Thus, the assumptions of the economic dependency of
women actually means that "the law treats female heirs as mothers
preferentially to male heirs as fathers"39 and through the obligation of
heirs to maintain the dependents of the deceased, not forsaking them.40
Judicial decisions have upheld these small compensating
privileges such as in sex discrimination challenges brought by men to the
provision in the Hindu Succession Act which gives a female Hindu the
right to absolute ownership of her property:
The court stated that "it may well be that in view of the inferior status enjoyed by the [sic]
females, the legislature thought fit to put the [sic] females on a higher pedestal,"... It
further held that women as a class were different from men as a class and the legislature
had merely removed the disability attaching to women.... In the court's view, as a special
provision intended to benefit and protect women who have traditionally been
discriminated against in terms of access to property, it was not open to Hindu males to
challenge the provision as hostile discrimination. 41
It will be clear from the foregoing that this book's account of law
is embedded in a rich understanding of the social and political context in
which law operates and the political struggles, of which legal struggles
are a part, which drive the historical evolution of the law. It is this sort
of understanding which can provide some clear, if also necessarily
complex, answers to one of the most enduring questions which has
dogged feminists, not to speak of other progressives, everywhere:
whether "the law can play [a role] in challenging existing social relations
... in the often quoted words of Audre Lorde, ... whether the master's
tools can be used to dismantle the master's house." 42 As Kapur and
Cossman put it: "Is law a subversive site?" 43 The authors would answer
with a tentative "yes it can be," if feminists have first examined "the
extent to which law constitutes and sustains the subordination of women.
We cannot, in other words, explore the possibilities of law without first,
or at least simultaneously, engaging with the limitations of law."44 But
simply admitting and accounting for the role of the law in perpetuating
women's subordination is only the beginning and addresses only a
certain rhetoric about the irredeemably patriarchal character of modern
3 9 Supra note 2 at 135.
40 Ibid. at 136.
41 Ibid. at 198-99.
42 Ibid at 286.
43 Ibid. at 11.
44 Ibid. at 74.
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states and laws. The question is also prompted by the more pervasive
feeling in the Indian women's movement, as in others, that although
generations of women and feminists have looked to the law to transform
women's situation, all too little seems to have altered in women's day to
day lives.45
A profusion of feminist debates have attempted to comprehend
the inability of women's formal legal equality to lead to substantive
equality. Reviewing these, Kapur and Cossman argue that this failure is
inaccurately construed as a failure of the law; it is because the
protagonists in these debates are burdened by an "under-theorization of
the role of law in social change."46 The centrality of the law in modern
organized efforts to improve women's status can hardly be disputed.
The three broad successive phases of the movements for women's rights
in India correspond to the three types of discourses about women and
law-protectionism, equality and patriarchy. Each of these has left a
layer of sediment in the soil of Indian law: "the [male] social reformers
in the nineteenth century with a protectionist approach, in seeking
protective legislation for women; the women in the independence
movement with an equality approach, in seeking equality rights and the
elimination of discrimination; and the contemporary women's approach
with a patriarchy approach." 47
The discussion practically demonstrates Kapur and Cossman's
thesis that law is "an important site of discursive struggle ... where
contests over the meaning of equality, of secularism, of political liberty
are fought out and where dominant meanings come to inform not only
judicial approaches, but also come to shape the way we understand the
world that we live in." 48 These larger political projects and contests
define and limit the possibilities for legal change. For example, the
religious articulation of the question of the legitimacy of colonial rule in
the first half of the nineteenth century meant that the discourses of both
the reformers and their religious opponents was informed by religious
45 Ibid. at 11. However, the reasons why this is so are open to dispute: "Is it because law is
inherently conservative and designed to resist the progressive agendas of feminist visionaries? Is it
because law is one of the many discourses which operate to sustain and naturalize unequal power
relations? Has law been too central in our struggles, or have we not fully exploited its potential?
Are we rightly disillusioned with law, or only with the unrealistic expectations we have of it?" Ibid.
at 21.
4 6 Ibid. at 21.
4 7 Ibid at 44.
48 Ibid. at 41-42.
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particularism and legal reform was channelled into a protectionism
toward women:
Women were not assumed to be equal to men; indeed, the discourse of equality was
strikingly absent from the debates, as were the voices of women themselves. Social
reformers sought to eliminate customs and practices that they considered to be evils
perpetrated on women. They sought protective forms of legislation, prohibiting these
practices.4 9
Kapur and Cossman urge, against the grain of fashionable post-
modern feminist disillusionment with the potential of the law, that,
conceived broadly as essential elements of broader political struggles
and projects, the law-legislation, litigation and legal literacy-can be
seen as an important instrument of struggle. Through a wide-ranging
and sensitive discussion of the pitfalls of the law, the authors insist that
legal strategies should not be abandoned to the Right. There are a
whole series of problems that have historically plagued feminist and
generally progressive engagement with the law. These include the
possibility of failure and disillusionment, the problem of accountability,
the potential erasure of specificities which the dominant liberal legal
discourse contains, the difficulty of evolving legal strategies in situations
of multiple and intersecting oppressions, and the legalization of
struggles. All these and others, the authors carefully argue, can be
addressed by a critical awareness of them, to which the final chapter so
well contributes. The message is that legal solutions are possible and
necessary to progressive change and worth working towards. But these
emerge from broader political understandings of the issues and
possibilities, forged in discussions with potential allies and, like political
struggles generally, offer no guarantee of success but which cannot,
therefore, be eschewed.
Kapur and Cossman's message is an important one when the
situation of the disadvantaged the world over is plagued with twin
dangers: first, that of an ascendant Right discourse powerfully waging
political and legal struggle to move established discourses and laws to
the right; and second, that of a fashionable post-modernist disdain for
liberal values and political and legal struggles in favour of equally-
fashionable "social" movements of dubious effectiveness against it.
4 9 Ibid. at 52.
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